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The Role of the United Nations in the Prosecution of 
International War Criminals 
Richard J. Goldstone* 
Prior to May, 1993 the topic of this address would have had little 
meaning. At that time, it was universally accepted that the only way 
the international community could prosecute war criminals was by 
establishing an international criminal court by way of treaty. For 
almost half a century, the several attempts by the United Nations 
(UN) to draft such a treaty failed. This failure was in spite of the 
1948 Genocide Convention that officially recognized the need for an 
international criminal judicial body. Article Seven of the Convention 
calls for persons charged with genocide to be prosecuted either by 
domestic courts or by “such international penal tribunal[s] as may 
have jurisdiction” to do so. 
Resolution, 260(III), adopted by the General Assembly in 
December, 1948 similarly acknowledged the need for an international 
court with criminal jurisdiction. The Resolution even called on the 
International Law Commission to investigate the possibility of 
creating such a body, including the set-up of a Criminal Chamber of 
the International Court of Justice. In 1950 the General Assembly set 
up a Special Committee to devise a draft statute for an international 
criminal court. Although the committee produced an original text in 
1951 and a revised text in 1953, the document floundered in the 
General Assembly because of disagreement on a definition for the 
crime of aggression. In 1957 the General Assembly decided to defer 
the initiative indefinitely. 
Even the criminal depravity of Pol Pot in Cambodia, Mengustu 
Haile Miriam in Ethiopia, and Saddam Hussein in Iraq did not move 
the international community to consider resurrecting attempts to 
establish an international criminal court. It was only when European 
criminals committed similar crimes in the former Yugoslavia that 
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some of the leading nations, in the face of overwhelming 
international public criticism, decided to make use of the Cold War 
thaw and do something about the massive crimes committed in the 
Balkans. 
It came as a surprise to the international community when in May, 
1999 the Security Council of the UN decided to establish the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
International lawyers had not contemplated that the powers of the 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter could be used for such 
a purpose. Those powers were designed to enable the world body to 
take preemptory action and remove threats to international peace and 
security. For that purpose, the Charter gives the Security Council the 
power to order military interventions, embargos, and sanctions. In a 
very innovative move, the Security Council decided that those 
Chapter VII powers confer by implication the capacity to establish a 
war crimes criminal tribunal. 
The Security Council could come to this determination only by 
making the crucial link between peace and justice. The Chapter VII 
powers could not have been used to establish the Tribunal without 
recognizing it as a mechanism for restoring peace in the former 
Yugoslavia. A similar determination was made in November, 1994 
when the Security Council established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
This link between peace and justice, between the work of the 
Criminal Tribunals and stability in Yugoslavia and Rwanda is, 
jurisprudentially speaking, extremely interesting. The link clearly 
shows that, in the international realm, the criminal law has a different 
focus from that in the domestic arena. National criminal laws 
function primarily to punish perpetrators for violating societal norms 
encapsulated in the common law and in statutes, and thereby provide 
satisfaction to the parties most directly injured by the crime. 
Although other subsidiary functions of national criminal law have 
been proposed—for example, Jeremy Bentham suggested a utilitarian 
conception of criminal law as an instrument of social control—
punishment and retribution remain the primary motivations of the 
domestic criminal justice system. 
On the international level, however, the crucial link between 
criminal prosecution and the preservation of peace and stability shifts 
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the focus away from pure retribution, to notions of restoring the rule 
of law and justly establishing the truth, thereby preventing denials 
and revisionism. Clearly, punishing the perpetrators of international 
crimes and providing the victimized population with a sense of 
retribution does play an important role. 
In establishing the ICTY, the Security Council correctly 
recognized that it had no law-making powers, as it was not a 
legislature. For that reason, the Security Council conferred upon its 
Tribunals the power to enforce only universally recognized criminal 
laws: violations of the Genocide Convention, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes that had become customary norms, and, in 
the case of the ICTY, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.  
There has been much debate as to why the Security Council used 
its powers to set up the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia. I would suggest that there were a number of 
reasons, including that at the end of the Cold War, Russia and China 
were prepared to agree to such a court being set up. In addition, the 
photographs of emaciated men behind barbed wire fences stirred the 
emotions of decent people world wide. Human rights organizations 
mobilized. And, most important of all, it was happening in Europe. 
In the case of Rwanda, it was less complicated. Genocide had then 
recently resulted in the murder of more than 500,000 people in less 
than 100 days. At the time, Rwanda occupied one of the 
nonpermanent seats on the Security Council. The war crimes were 
committed in a situation of internal armed conflict. The precedent 
existed, and the Security Council readily embraced the idea. So keen 
were its members that when Rwanda objected to the way in which the 
Tribunal was being constituted and withdrew its support for the idea, 
the Council insisted that the process continue and the Tribunal was 
established over a single negative vote—that of Rwanda itself. 
In the months following the establishment of the ICTY, the 
Security Council, with the cooperation of the General Assembly, 
appointed the eleven Tribunal judges. In the fall of 1993, the Security 
Council appointed the first Chief Prosecutor, the then-attorney 
general of Venezuela, Ramon Escovar-Salom. He took his office in 
the Hague in January, 1994 and after three days resigned to accept 
the position of Minister of the Interior in his home country. 
Approximately nine months after the ICTY had been established, it 
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was still without a prosecutor, effectively preventing investigation of 
any cases. By then, however, the judges already were hard at work 
settling the rules of procedure and evidence, and were already 
concerned that there were no trials, even in the pipeline. 
The Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, according to its statute, is 
required to be appointed by the Security Council on the nomination 
of the Secretary-General. Between January and June, 1994, 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali nominated eight people for 
the position, but each of them was vetoed. Five such nominees were 
vetoed by Russia, presumably because they came from NATO 
member countries. In desperation at the end of June, Boutros-Ghali 
decided to look for a South African. Nelson Mandela had been 
recently inaugurated as the first democratically elected head of state 
and it was felt that no member of the Security Council would wish to 
veto a nominee who carried his support. 
My nomination was made in light of my then-recent position as 
chairman of the Commission of Inquiry into Political Violence and 
Intimidation, a Commission which brought to light important “third 
force” activities by elements of the South African security forces who 
were opposed to democratic change. Mandela supported my 
nomination and, as a result, it was unanimously approved by the 
Security Council only thirty-six hours later. 
I assumed, in my innocence and ignorance, that the ICTY, having 
been established by unanimous resolution of the Security Council and 
followed by my own similar approval, would have sufficient funds 
for me to carry out my mandate. I was wrong. In fact, there were 
almost no funds at all, and it was only at the beginning of 1995 that 
the Tribunal’s budget was approved by the General Assembly. This 
lack of funding seriously delayed setting up a functioning Office of 
the Prosecutor. We were starved of both human and material 
resources. The result was frustration for the victims in Bosnia for 
whom the Tribunal was truly established and serious erosion of the 
credibility of the institution. 
The funding problem was a direct consequence of the refusal by 
the United States to pay its UN dues. All organs of the world body 
were severely lacking money and every dollar given to us was a 
dollar less for another UN organ. In 1995 the UN’s financial crisis 
was so severe that the Secretary-General ordered that no UN official 
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was to travel until further notice. This created a crisis in the Office of 
the Prosecutor. Our investigators became office-bound and literally 
had no work to do. Thankfully, we found a solution in drawing on 
money from the Tribunal’s trust fund, but the situation was far from 
ideal. 
Another serious problem which I faced in setting up the office in 
the Hague related to the recruitment of suitably experienced experts 
in the relevant fields. Being a UN office, it was important to ensure 
that there was an appropriate geographic and gender balance. Not 
surprisingly, the employment procedures in the UN are cumbersome 
and time consuming. The rules were not made with Criminal 
Tribunals in mind as there had never been any similar institution in 
the history of the organization. 
The problems were exacerbated in the case of the ICTR. When the 
Security Council resolved to establish the Rwanda tribunal it decided 
that the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY should also hold that position 
for the ICTR. It was difficult enough to persuade suitable people to 
come and work for the ICTY in the Hague. It was another matter 
entirely to persuade similar people to relocate to Kigali in the 
aftermath of a genocide. The security situation was such that the UN 
refused to allow spouses or other family members to accompany 
employees of the tribunal. 
While on the one hand, the refusal of the United States to pay its 
UN dues led to grave problems for the Tribunals, on the other, the 
United States played a crucial role in taking steps to ensure that the 
two Tribunals were able to begin their work. It was Madeline 
Albright, as the U.S. Ambassador at the UN, who was primarily 
responsible for the donation of human and financial resources, 
resulting in many millions of dollars of support for the Tribunals. If 
not for that assistance, in all probability, the Tribunals would have 
failed. 
I have described only a few of the many delays in establishing the 
two Tribunals. Yet I have done so in order to demonstrate how 
necessary it is to have a permanent international criminal court. There 
are serious war crimes to investigate. Thus, it is not acceptable that 
several years must pass before a UN ad hoc tribunal can begin its 
work. Justice must not be delayed. Aside from being inefficient, it is 
grossly unfair to expect victims of those horrendous crimes to wait 
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before the wheels of justice begin to turn. Therefore, while the role of 
the UN in setting up the ad hoc tribunals has been fundamentally 
important, the route chosen for their establishment is not an efficient 
or desirable one. 
Indeed, the most serious threat to the credibility, and indeed the 
very essence, of the Tribunals has come from politically inspired 
delays in the arrest of indicted war criminals. The most visible and 
publicized of these failures of the international community to support 
the Tribunals have been in respect of the arrest of major Serbian 
leaders who were indicted by the ICTY—Milosovic, Karadzic and 
Mladic. 
The case of Karadzic is the most unfortunate. When he was 
indicted on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity in July, 
1995 UN troops in Bosnia could have undoubtedly arrested him. The 
same is probably the case for Mladic, who was indicted for the same 
war crimes. The troops in Bosnia did not arrest these suspected war 
criminals simply because the Pentagon military leaders were not 
prepared to risk American lives. Yet what were American troops, 
armed and in uniform, doing in Bosnia if they were not prepared to 
take risks in the performance of their duties? The great tragedy is that 
if these wanted war criminals had been arrested in 1995, some of the 
tragic events which occurred since then, especially in Srebrenica and 
in Kosovo, may have been avoided. 
Concern has again mounted with regard to the arrest of Milosovic. 
His spectacular ousting by Vojislav Kostunica in the September, 
2000 presidential elections has, unfortunately, decreased the 
prospects of bringing him to justice. Kostunica, eager to preserve the 
tenuous stability that emerged since his election victory, has declared 
that he will not arrest Milosevic for war crimes or even for the 
apparent electorial fraud that almost denied Kostunica the presidency. 
Western governments, who are formally committed to getting 
Milosevic to the Hague for prosecution, clearly endorse Kostunica’s 
approach. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been readmitted to 
the UN without any demand for the surrender of Serbs indicted for 
war crimes. The result is further damage to the ICTY and the 
progress of international justice. 
Despite the difficulties encountered by the two International 
Tribunals, they have achieved important successes. In my view, the 
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most important success is the demonstration that international courts 
can hold fair trials. That fact was by no means accepted or assumed 
when they began their work. The policy in the Office of the 
Prosecutor, certainly during my term of office, was that the goal in 
any prosecution was that the trial would be judged as having been fair 
to the defendants. If we succeeded in winning a conviction, then so 
much the better. The assistance rendered to defense teams by the 
American Bar Association played a crucial role in ensuring that the 
first trials in the Hague were fair by international standards. 
Additionally, the tribunals advanced humanitarian law. Prior to 
the beginning of the judges’ work on the ICTY and ICTR, 
humanitarian law was all but an academic subject. Unenforced laws 
stagnated, and it was to the great credit of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross that humanitarian law continued 
developing. That development was accelerated by the Tribunals. 
Today, the gap between international armed conflict and internal 
armed conflict, which had been narrowing, has all but disappeared. 
Systematic mass rape, for the first time, has been recognized widely 
as a war crime. These developments would not have occurred but for 
the work of the two Tribunals. 
There is no longer impunity for war criminals, as has been clearly 
demonstrated by the ICTR in its conviction of Jean Kambanda, 
former Prime Minister of Rwanda the and the first head of 
government successfully prosecuted for genocide. Moreover, I 
believe that it is unlikely that Pinochet would have been arrested in 
London but for the existence of the tribunals. Karadzic and Mladic 
remain hunted, and Milosovic cannot travel outside Serbia. Other war 
criminals also cannot travel freely. Some of them are no longer able 
to seek medical treatment in European hospitals due to fear of arrest. 
National borders and sovereignty are no longer able to protect 
leaders, whether political or military, who commit gross human rights 
violations against their own people. 
The most important consequence of the UN prosecutions of war 
criminals, however, has been the impetus given to the movement 
towards establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Again, it 
is ironic that without the efforts of the United States, it is unlikely 
that the Rome diplomatic conference of June and July, 1998 would 
have convened. The irony lies, however, in the United States 
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distancing itself from the treaty that was so successfully negotiated in 
Rome. 
There seems to be something schizophrenic about the United 
States government and Congress. The United States completely 
condemns the commission of war crimes, but at the same time guards 
its sovereignty so vigorously that it refuses to embrace the Rome 
process and join with the rest of the international community in 
subjecting itself to universal rules of justice. 
At the Millennium Summit of the UN General Assembly last 
September, the world’s leaders drafted a declaration in which they 
committed themselves to a host of values, principles, and to 
reinvigorating the UN through pursuit of those values and upholding 
those principles.1 But while the declaration is a truly inspirational 
document, it is a little disappointing from the perspective of 
humanitarian law. 
In several places, the Declaration commits leaders, both 
individually and acting as representatives of the international 
community, to “strengthen respect for the rule of law.” This promise 
is made, however, primarily in the context of ensuring compliance 
with the International Court of Justice. No mention is made of 
respecting obligations arising from the Security Council resolutions 
which established the ICTY and ICTR. The Declaration is similarly 
silent on the ICC. This is a great pity because, as the final article of 
the Declaration acknowledges, the UN is “the indispensable common 
house of the entire human family, through which we seek to realize 
our universal aspirations for peace, cooperation and development.”2 
As such, the impetus towards respect for, and enforcement of, the 
laws of war and the concomitant prosecution of war criminals should 
come from the UN. 
The ICC will likely become operational in the next two or three 
years. It is all but certain that the United States will not play a role in 
that endeavor. Article 13(b) of the Rome Treaty relating to the 
Security Council could become crucial. This provision holds that the 
Council, acting under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, may refer a 
 
 1 . G.A. Res. 2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 61(b), U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/2 
(2000). 
 2 . Id. 
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situation to the ICC. In that event, the ICC would have powers 
similar to those conferred upon the ICTY and ICTR. 
It is my hope, therefore, that the UN, with the support of as many 
countries a possible, including the United States, will find a way to 
extend its commitment to the rule of law into the arena of 
humanitarian law and thus ensure the creation of a workable 
International Criminal Court to safeguard international peace and 
dispense international justice. 
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